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Abstract
In automated trust negotiation (ATN), two parties exchange digitally signed credentials that contain attribute in-
formation to establish trust and make access control decisions. Because the information in question is often sensitive,
credentials are protected according to access control policies. In traditional ATN, credentials are transmitted either in
their entirety or not at all. This approach can at times fail unnecessarily, either because a cyclic dependency makes
neither negotiator willing to reveal her credential before her opponent, because the opponent must be authorized for
all attributes packaged together in a credential to receive any of them, or because it is necessary to fully disclose the
attributes, rather than merely proving they satisfy some predicate (such as being over 21 years of age). Recently,
several cryptographic credential schemes and associated protocols have been developed to address these and other
problems. However, they can be used only as fragments of an ATN process. This paper introduces a framework
for ATN in which the diverse credential schemes and protocols can be combined, integrated, and used as needed. A
policy language is introduced that enables negotiators to specify authorization requirements that must be met by an
opponent to receive various amounts of information about certiﬁed attributes and the credentials that contain it. The
language also supports the use of uncertiﬁed attributes, allowing them to be required as part of policy satisfaction,
and to place their (automatic) disclosure under policy control.
1 Introduction
In automated trust negotiation (ATN) [16, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37], two parties exchange digitally signed
credentials that contain attribute information to establish trust and make access control decisions. In traditional ATN
approaches the only way to use a credential is to send it as a whole, thus disclosing all the information in the credential.
In other words, a digital credential is viewed as a black-box, and the information in a credential is disclosed in an all-
or-nothing fashion. In these approaches sensitive attribute values stored in a credential are protected using access
control techniques. There is an access control policy associated with each credential and a credential can be disclosed
if its access control policy has been satisﬁed. Viewing a credential as a black-box severely limits the power of ATN.
The following are some of the limitations.
• If there is a cyclic dependency among credentials and their policies, negotiations can fail unnecessarily. For
example, in a negotiation between A and B, suppose A has a credential c1 that can be disclosed only if B has
c2, and B has c2, but can disclose it only if A has c1. Using traditional ATN techniques, the negotiation would
fail because neither c1 and c2 can be disclosed before the other is, even though allowing A and B to exchange
both c1 and c2 would not violate either negotiator’s policy.
• Because attribute information is disclosed in an all-or-nothing fashion, each attribute can be disclosed only
when the policy governing the credential and its entire contents is satisﬁed, leading to unnecessary failure. For
example, suppose B would allow A to access a resource provided that A is over 21, and A has a digital driver
license that includes A’s date of birth (DoB) and address. If A does not want to reveal her address (or her exact
DoB) to B, the negotiation would fail, even if A would be willing to prove she is over 21.
• When one negotiator does not want to disclose detailed information about his policy and the other negotiator
does not want to disclose too much information about her attributes, a negotiation can fail even though the
1amount of information that needs to be disclosed by each party is acceptable to both. For example, suppose B is
a bank that offers a special-rate loan and A would like to know whether she is eligible for such a loan before she
applies. B is willing to reveal that his loan-approval policy uses one’s DoB, current salary, and the length of the
current employment; however, B considers further details of this policy to be a trade secret that he is unwilling
to reveal. A would like to know whether she is eligible for the loan while disclosing as little information about
her attributes as possible. In particular, A does not want to disclose the exact values of her DoB or salary level.
Using traditional ATN techniques, this negotiation would fail.
A number of cryptographic credential schemes and associated protocols have been developed to address these and
other problems. Oblivious signature based envelope [21], hidden credentials [6, 17], and secret handshakes [2] can
be used to address the policy cycle problem. Oblivious Attribute Certiﬁcates (OACerts) [19], private credentials [7],
and anonymous credentials [8, 9, 10, 25] together with zero-knowledge proof protocols can be used to prove that
an attribute satisﬁes a policy without disclosing any other information about the attribute. Certiﬁed input private
policy evaluation (CIPPE) [20] enables A and B to determine whether A’s attribute values satisfy B’s policies without
revealing additional information about A’s attributes or B’s policies.
While these credential schemes and associated protocols all address some limitations in ATN, they can be used
only as fragments of an ATN process. For example, a protocol that can be used to handle cyclic policy dependencies
should be invoked only when such a cycle occurs during the negation process. A zero-knowledge proof protocol can
be used only when one knows the policy that needs to be satisﬁed and is willing to disclose the necessary information
to satisfy the policy. An ATN framework that harness these powerful cryptographic credentials and protocols has yet
to be developed. In this paper, we develop an ATN framework that does exactly that. Our framework has the following
salient features.
• The ATN framework supports diverse credentials, including standard digital credentials (such as X.509 certiﬁ-
cates [3, 18]) as well as OACerts, hidden credentials, and anonymous credentials.
• In addition to attribute information stored in credentials, the ATN framework supports also attribute information
that is not certiﬁed. For example, oftentimes one is asked to provide a phone number in an online transaction,
and the phone number may not be certiﬁed in any certiﬁcate. In our framework, uncertiﬁed attribute information
and certiﬁed attribute information are protected in a uniform fashion.
• The ATN framework has a logic-based policy langauge that we call Attribute-based Trust Negotiation Language
(ATNL), which allows one to specify policies that govern the disclosure of partial information about a sensitive
attribute. ATNL is based on the RT family of Role-based Trust-management languages [22, 23, 24].
• The ATN framework has a negotiation protocol that enables the various cryptographic protocols to be used to
improve the effectiveness of ATN. This protocol is an extension of the Trust-Target Graph (TTG) ATN proto-
col [30, 31].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss related work in Section 2, and then review several
credential schemes and associated protocols that can be used in ATN in Section 3. In Section 4, we present the
language ATNL. In Section 5 we present our negotiation protocol. We conclude our paper in Section 6.
2 Related Work
Automated trust negotiation was introduced by Winsborough et al. [32], who presented two negotiation strategies: an
eager strategy in which negotiators disclose each credential as soon as its access control policy is satisﬁed, and a “par-
simonious” strategy in which negotiators disclose credentials only after exchanging sufﬁcient policy content to ensure
that a successful outcome is ensured. Yu et al. [37] developed a family of strategies called the disclosure tree family
such that strategies within the family can interoperate with each other in the sense that negotiators can use different
strategies within the same family. Seamons et al. [27] and Yu and Winslett [36] studied the problem of protecting
contents of policies as well as credentials. On the aspect of system architecture for trust negotiation, Hess et al. [16]
proposed the Trust Negotiation in TLS (TNT) protocol, which is an extension to the SSL/TLS handshake protocol by
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tems. The problem of leaking attribute information was recognized by Winsborough and Li [30], Seamons et al. [28],
and Yu and Winslett [35]. Winsborough and Li [29, 30, 31] introduced the notion of acknowledgement policies to pro-
tect this information and provided a formal notion of safety against illegal attribute information leakage. Bonatti and
Samarati [4] proposed a framework for regulating service access and information release on the web. Their framework
supports both certiﬁed attributes and uncertiﬁed attributes.
Recent work on using cryptographic protocols for ATN includes hidden credentials [6, 15, 17], secret hand-
shakes [2], oblivious signature based envelope [21], oblivious commitment based envelope [19], certiﬁed input pri-
vate policy evaluation [20], and policy-based cryptography [1]. While these protocols are useful tools and build-
ing blocks for ATN, they are not general enough to solve arbitrary trust negotiation problems in a systematic way.
Credential schemes that can be used in ATN include OACerts [19], private credentials [7], and anonymous creden-
tials [8, 9, 10, 25]. We will summarize the features of these protocols and credential schemes in the next section.
3 Overview of Cryptographic Credentials and Tools for ATN
We now give an overview of six properties that are provided by cryptographic credential schemes and their associated
cryptographic tools. These properties can improve the privacy protection and effectiveness of ATN.
1. Separation of credential disclosure from attribute disclosure: In several credential systems, including private
credentials [7], anonymous credentials [8, 9, 10, 25], and OACerts [19], a user’s attribute values are not stored
in the clear; instead, they are stored in a committed form in her credentials. When the commitment of an
attribute value is stored in a credential, looking at the commitment does not enable one to learn anything about
the attribute value. Therefore, a credential holder can disclose her credentials without revealing the attribute
values in them. For example, consider a digital driver license certiﬁcate from Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV)
consisting of name, gender, DoB, and address. In trust negotiation, a user can show that her digital driver license
is valid, i.e., that she is currently a valid driver, without disclosing any of her name, gender, DoB, and address.
2. Selective show of attributes: A credential holder can select which attributes she wants to disclose (and which
attribute she does not want to disclose) to the veriﬁer. As each attribute in a credential is in committed form, the
credential holder can simply open the commitments of the attributes she wants to reveal. For instance, using the
digital driver license, the credential holder can show her name and address to a veriﬁer without disclosing her
gender and DoB. Cryptographic properties of the commitment schemes ensure that the credential holder cannot
open a commitment with a value other than the one that has been committed.
3. Zero-knowledge proof of attributes satisfying a policy: A credential holder can use zero-knowledge proof
protocols [5, 11, 12, 14] to prove that her attributes satisfy some property without revealing the actual attribute
values. For example, a credential holder can prove that she is older than 21 by using her digital driver license
without revealing any other information about her actual DoB.
4. Oblivious usage of a credential: A credential holder can use her credentials in an oblivious way to access
resources using Oblivious Signature Based Envelope (OSBE) [21], hidden credentials [17], or secret hand-
shakes [2]. In OSBE, a user sends the contents of her credential (without the signature) to a server. The server
veriﬁes that the contents satisfy his requirement, then conducts a joint computation with the user such that in the
end the user sees the server’s resource if and only if she has the signature on the contents she sent earlier. The
hidden credentials and the secret handshakes share the similar concept; however, they assume that the server can
guess the contents of the user’s credentials; thus the user does not need to send the contents to the server. The
oblivious usage of a credential enables a user to obtain a resource from a server without revealing the fact that
she has the credential.
5. Oblivious usage of an attribute: A credential holder can use her attributes in an oblivious way to access re-
sources using Oblivious Commitment Based Envelop (OCBE) [19]. In OCBE, a credential holder and a server
run a protocol such that in the end the credential holder receives the server’s resource if and only if the attributes
in her credential satisfy the server’s policy. The server does not learn anything about the credential holder’s
attribute values, not even whether the values satisfy the policy or not.
36. Certiﬁed input private policy evaluation (CIPPE): In CIPPE [20], a credential holder and a server run a protocol
in which the credential holder inputs the commitments of her attribute values from her credentials, and the server
inputshisprivatepolicyfunction. Intheend, bothpartieslearnwhetherthecredentialholdersatisﬁestheserver’s
policy, without revealing the attribute values to the server or the private function to the credential holder. For
example, suppose that the server’s policy is that age must be greater than 25 and the credential holder’s age
is 30. The credential holder can learn that she satisﬁes the server’s policy without revealing her exact DoB or
knowing the threshold in the server’s policy.
There are other useful properties achieved in the private credentials [7] and the anonymous credentials [8, 9, 10,
25], such as multi-show unlinkable property, anonymous property, etc. Some of these properties require anonymous
communication channels to be useful. In this paper, we focus on the six properties described above, because we believe
they are most related to trust negotiation. Our goal is to integrate them into a coherent trust negotiation framework.
Note that we do not assume each negotiating participant supports all six properties. For instance, if one participant
uses an anonymous credential system and supports properties 1–3, and the other participant supports properties 1–6,
then they can use properties 1–3 when they negotiate trust. We present an ATN framework that can take advantage of
these properties when they are available, but that does not require them.
4 The Language of Credentials and Policies
In this section, we present the Attribute-based Trust Negotiation Language (ATNL), a formal language for specifying
credentials and policies. ATNL is based on RT, a family of Role-base Trust-management languages introduced
in [22, 23, 24]. We ﬁrst give an example trust negotiation scenario in ATNL, then describe the syntax of ATNL in
detail in Section 4.2.
4.1 An Example
Inthisexample, thetwo negotiators areBookSt (a bookstore) and Alice. We give thecredentials and policies belonging
to BookSt ﬁrst, then give those for Alice, and then describe a negotiation process between BookSt and Alice.
BookSt’s credentials:
ℓ1 : SBA.businessLicense ←− BookSt
ℓ2 : BBB.goodSecProcess ←− BookSt
BookSt’s policies:
m1 : BookSt.discount(phoneNum = x3) ←− StateU.student(program = x1) ∩ BookSt.DoB(val = x2)
∩ Any.phoneNum(val ⇒ x3) ;
((x1 = ‘cs’) ∧ (x2 > ‘01/01/1984’))
m2 : BookSt.DoB(val = x) ←− BMV.driverLicense(DoB = x)
m3 : BookSt.DoB(val = x) ←− Gov.passport(DoB = x)
Figure 1: The credentials and policies of BookSt
BookSt’s credentials and policies are given in Figure 1. BookSt has a credential (ℓ1) issued by the Small Business
Administration (SBA) asserting that BookSt has a valid business license. BookSt is certiﬁed in (ℓ2) by the Better
Business Bureau (BBB) to have a good security process.
BookSt offers a special discount to anyone who satisﬁes the policy (m1), which means that the requester should
be certiﬁed by StateU to be a student majoring in computer science, under 21, and willing to provide a phone number.
Since the discount is a resource, the head of this policy, BookSt.discount(phoneNum = x3), deﬁnes a part of the
application interface provided by the ATN system using this policy; the parameter phoneNum is made available to
the application through this interface. That is, the application will issue a query to determine whether the requester
satisﬁes BookSt.discount(phoneNum = x3), and if it succeeds, the variable x3 will be instantiated to the phone
4number of the requester. The body of policy (m1) (i.e., the part to the right of←−) consists of the following two parts.
Part 1: StateU.student(program = x1) ∩ BookSt.DoB(val = x2) ∩ Any.phoneNum(val ⇒ x3)
Part 2: ((x1 = ‘cs’) ∧ (x2 > ’01/01/1984’))
Part 1 describes the role requirement of the policy and consists of the intersection of 3 roles. To satisfy the role
StateU.student(program = x1), one must provide a credential (or a credential chain) showing that one is certiﬁed
by StateU to be a student; program = x1 means that the value of the program ﬁeld is required to satisfy additional
constraints. In Any.phoneNum(val ⇒ x3), the keyword Any means that the phone number does not need to be
certiﬁed by any party and the symbol ⇒ means that the phone number must be provided (enabling it to be returned to
the application). Part 2 describes the constraints on speciﬁc ﬁeld values.
BookSt’s policies (m2) and (m3) mean that BookSt considers both a driver license from BMV and a passport
issued by the government (Gov) to be valid documents for DoB.
Alice’s credentials:
n1 : StateU.student ←− CoS.student
n2 : CoS.student(program = ‘cs’,level = ‘sophomore’) ←− Alice
n3 : BMV.driverLicense(name = commit(‘Alice’),DoB = commit(‘03/07/1986’)) ←− Alice
Alice’s attribute declarations:
o1 : phoneNum = ‘(123)456-7890’ :: :: sensitive
o2 : DoB = ‘03/07/1986’ :: BMV.driverLicense(DoB) :: sensitive
o3 : program = ‘cs’ :: CoS.student(program) :: non-sensitive
o4 : level = ‘sophomore’ :: CoS.student(level) :: non-sensitive
Alice’s policies:
p1 : disclose(ac,CoS.student) ←− SBA.businessLicense
p2 : disclose(full,DoB) ←− BBB.goodSecProcess
p3 : disclose(full,phoneNum) ←− BBB.goodSecProcess
p4 : disclose(range,DoB,year) ←− true
Figure 2: The credentials and policies possessed by Alice
Alice’s credentials and policies are given in Figure 2. Alice holds three credentials. Credential (n1) is issued by
StateU and delegates to College of Science (CoS) the authority to certify students. Credential (n2) is Alice’s student
certiﬁcate issued by CoS. Credentials (n1, n2) prove that Alice is a valid student from StateU. Credential (n3) is her
digital driver license issued by BMV. For simplicity, we assume that the digital driver license contains only name and
DoB. Among her credentials, Alice considers her student certiﬁcate to be sensitive, and provides it only to those who
have a valid business license from SBA (p1). Alice does not protect the content of her driver license, except for its
DoB ﬁeld. She considers her date of birth and phone number to be sensitive information, thus she reveals them only to
organizations whose security practices are adequate to provide reasonable privacy (p2,p3). For this, we assume that
BBB provides a security process auditing service. Further, Alice is willing to reveal to everyone her year of birth (p4).
A negotiation between BookSt and Alice When Alice requests a discount sale from BookSt, BookSt responds
with his discount policy (m1). Alice ﬁrst discloses her driver license (n3), which is assumed to be an OACert, to
BookSt without revealing her DoB. To protect her phone number and her student certiﬁcate, Alice wants BookSt to
show a business license issued by SBA and a good security process certiﬁcate issued by BBB. After BookSt shows
the corresponding certiﬁcates (ℓ1, ℓ2), Alice reveals her student certiﬁcate chain (n1, n2) and phone number (o1). As
Alice is allowed by her policy p4 to reveal her year of birth to everyone, she uses a zero-knowledge proof protocol
to prove to BookSt that her DoB in her driver license is between ‘1/1/1986’ and ‘12/31/1986’. BookSt now knows
that Alice is younger than 21, thus satisﬁes his discount policy. During the above interactions, Alice proves that she is
entitled to obtain the discount.
The above negotiation process uses the ﬁrst three properties described in Section 3.
5 list of X  ::=  X  |  X  “,”  list of X  (1)
 set of X  ::= ǫ |  X   set of X  (2)
 policy-base  ::=  set of credential   set of attr-decl   set of policy-stmt  (3)
 credential  ::=  member-cred  |  delegation-cred  (4)
 member-cred  ::=  role  “←−”  prin  (5)
 delegation-cred  ::=  role  “←−”  role  (6)
 role  ::=  prin  “.”  role-term  (7)
 role-term  ::=  role-name  |  role-name  “(”  list of ﬁeld  “)” (8)
 ﬁeld  ::=  ﬁeld-name  “=” (  var  |  constant  |  commitment  ) (9)
 attr-decl  ::=  attr-name  “=”  constant  “::” [  list of attr-ref  ]
“::” ( “sensitive” | “non-sensitive” ) (10)
 attr-ref  ::=  prin  “.”  role-name  “(”  ﬁeld-name  “)” (11)
 policy-stmt  ::=  policy-head  “←−”  policy-body  (12)
 policy-body  ::=  p-role-req  [ “;”  p-constraint  ] | true (13)
 p-role-req  ::= [ pre-cond  “!”]  conj-of-p-roles  (14)
 p-constraint  ::= [ pre-cond  “!”]  constraint  (15)
 pre-cond  ::=  role  | “false” (16)
 conj-of-p-roles  ::=  p-role  |  p-role  “∩”  conj-of-p-roles  (17)
 p-role  ::=  prin  “.”  p-role-term  | Any. p-role-term  (18)
 p-role-term  ::=  role-name  |  role-name  “(”  list of p-ﬁeld  “)” (19)
 p-ﬁeld  ::=  ﬁeld-name  ( “=” | “⇒” ) (  var  |  constant  ) (20)
 policy-head  ::=  role  |  dis-ack  |  dis-ac  |  dis-full  |  dis-bit  |  dis-range  (21)
 dis-ack  ::= “disclose” “(” “ack” “,”  role  “)” (22)
 dis-ac  ::= “disclose” “(” “ac” “,”  role  “)” (23)
 dis-full  ::= “disclose” “(” “full” “,”  attr-name  “)” (24)
 dis-bit  ::= “disclose” “(” “bit” “,”  attr-name  “)” (25)
 dis-range  ::= “disclose” “(” “range” “,”  attr-name ,  precision  “)” (26)
Figure 3: Syntax of ATNL in BNF. The ﬁrst two deﬁnitions  list of X  and  set of X  are macros parameterized by X.
The symbol ǫ in (2) denotes the empty string. The symbols  var ,  constant , and  prin  each represents a variable,
a constant, and a principal respectively. The symbols  role-name ,  ﬁeld-name , and  attr-name  represent identiﬁers
drawn from disjoint sets. The syntax for non-terminals  commitment ,  precision ,  constraint  are not deﬁned here;
they are explained in the text.
4.2 The Syntax
Figure 3 gives the syntax of ATNL in Backus Naur Form (BNF). In the following, we explain the syntax. The numbers
in the text below correspond to the numbers of deﬁnitions in Figure 3.
Each negotiation party has a policy base (3) that contains all information that may be used in trust negotiation. A
party’s policy base consists of three parts: credentials, attribute declarations, and policy statements. In the following,
we discuss each of the three parts in detail.
64.2.1 Credentials and Roles
Two central concepts that ATNL takes from RT [23, 24] are principals and roles. A principal is identiﬁed with an
individual or agent, and may be represented by a public key. In this sense, principals can issue credentials and make
requests. A role designates a set of principals who are members of this role. Each principal has its own localized name
space for roles in which it has sole authority to deﬁne roles. A role (7) takes the form of a principal followed by a role
term, separated by a dot. The simplest kind of a role term consists of just a role name. As roles are parameterized, a
role term may also contain ﬁelds, which will be explained later. We use A, B, D, S, and V , sometimes with subscripts,
to denote principals. We use R, often with subscripts, to denote role terms. A role A.R can be read as A’s R role.
Only A has the authority to deﬁne the members of the role A.R, and A does so by issuing role-deﬁnition statements.
In ATNL, a credential can be either a membership credential or a delegation credential. A membership credential
(5) takes the form of A.R←−D, where A and D are (possibly the same) principals. This means that A deﬁnes D to
be a member of A’s role R. A delegation credential (6) takes the form of A.R←−B.R1, where A and B are (possibly
the same) principals, and R and R1 are role terms. In this statement, A deﬁnes its R role to include all members of
B’s R1 role.
For example, BookSt’s credential (ℓ1) in Figure 1 is a membership credential. It means SBA issued a business
license certiﬁcate for BookSt. Alice’s credential (n1) in Figure 2 is a delegation credential. It says that StateU
delegates its authority over identifying students to CoS. Alice’s credential (n2) in Figure 2 means that CoS asserts that
Alice is a sophomore student in StateU majoring in computer science.
A role term (8) is a role name possibly followed by a list of ﬁelds. Each ﬁeld (9) has a ﬁeld name and a ﬁeld
value. A ﬁeld value can be a variable, a constant, or a commitment. For example, SBA.businessLicense is a
role without any ﬁelds, CoS.student(program = ‘cs’,level = ‘sophomore’) and BMV.driverLicense(name =
commit(‘Alice’),DoB = commit(‘03/07/1986’)) are roles with ﬁelds. In the preceding roles, CoS is a principal
name, student is a role name, program is a ﬁeld name, ‘cs’ is a constant of string type, and commit(‘Alice’) is a
commitment. In ATNL, a commitment takes of the form of commit(c), where c is a constant, and commit denotes the
output of a commitment algorithm of a commitment scheme [13, 26]1.
If a credential is a regular certiﬁcate, such as an X.509 certiﬁcate [18], then each ﬁeld in the credential takes the
form of x = c, where x is the ﬁeld name and c is a constant. For example, Alice’s student certiﬁcate (n2) may be an
X.509 certiﬁcate. When a credential is implemented as a cryptographic certiﬁcate, such as an OACert or an anonymous
credential, the attribute values are committed in the credential. Therefore, each ﬁeld takes the form of x = commit(c),
where commit(c) is the commitment of a constant c. For example, Alice’s digital driver license (n3) is modeled as a
cryptographic certiﬁcate.
4.2.2 Attribute declarations
Each attribute declaration (10) gives the name of the attribute, the value of the attribute, a list of attribute references
that correspond to this attribute, and whether this attribute is considered sensitive or not. For example, Alice’s attribute
declaration (o1) in Figure 2 means that Alice has a phone number (123)456-7890 and she considers her phone number
to be sensitive information. Alice’s attribute declaration (o3) indicates that Alice’s major is ‘cs’ and that her program
appears in her student certiﬁcate, issued by CoS. We use attr to denote attribute names.
Each attribute reference (11) corresponds to a ﬁeld name in a role. The attribute reference is used to link
the declared attribute to a speciﬁc role ﬁeld. For example, Alice’s DoB attribute declaration has an attribute
reference BMV.driverLicense(DoB), it means that Alice’s DoB is documented in the DoB ﬁeld of the role
BMV.driverLicense. It is possible to have several attribute references for an attribute. This means that the attribute is
documented by several roles2. For example, suppose Alice also has a passport, and her DoB is certiﬁed in her passport.
1In order to have the hiding property, a commitment scheme usually cannot be deterministic, thus the commitment of a value also depends on a
secret random value. For simplicity of presentation, we do not explicitly model the random secret in the representation of a commitment.
2We assume that the attribute values from different roles are the same, however we do not require each principal to use the same ﬁeld name. For
example, BMV may use DoB as the ﬁeld name for date of birth, whereas Gov uses BirthDate as the ﬁeld name. Name agreement for different
ﬁeld names can be achieved using application domain speciﬁcation documents [23, 24].
7Then the attribute declaration for her DoB looks like
DoB = ‘03/07/1986’ :: BMV.driverLicense(DoB),
Gov.passport(BirthDate) :: sensitive
Because the disclosure of attribute values in a credential can be separated from the disclosure of the credential, one
purpose of the attribute declarations is to uniformly manage the disclosure of an attribute value that appears in dif-
ferent credentials. That is, the policy author gives disclosure policies for attribute DoB, instead of assigning separate
disclosure policies for BMV.driverLicense(DoB) and Gov.passport(BirthDate).
When the list of the attribute references is empty, the corresponding attribute does not appear in any role that
is certiﬁed by a credential. In other words, the attribute is uncertiﬁed by any authorities. Unlike most prior trust
negotiation systems, our framework supports uncertiﬁed attributes. In many online e-business scenarios, like the
example in Section 4.1, the access control policies require some personal information about the requester, such as
phone number and email address, which may not be documented by any digitally signed credentials. Like certiﬁed
attributes, uncertiﬁed attributes may be sensitive, and should be protected in the same way. We treat all attributes
uniformly, whether certiﬁed or not, by protecting them with disclosure policies.
If an attribute is not sensitive, then the keyword non-sensitive appears at the end of its corresponding attribute
declaration. This means that the attribute can be revealed to anyone. There is no access control policy for this attribute.
On the other hand, if an attribute is treated as a sensitive resource, the attribute owner will mark its attribute declaration
with the keyword sensitive. In this case, if there are disclosure policy statements for this attribute, one has to satisfy
the body of one of these statements to learn information about the attribute. If there is no disclosure policy statement
for a sensitive attribute, it means the attribute must never be disclosed.
4.2.3 Policy statements
In ATNL, a policy statement (12) takes the form  policy-head ←− policy-body  in which  policy-body  either is true
or takes the form:
pre-cond-1 ! B1.R1 ∩     ∩ Bk.Rk ;
pre-cond-2 ! ψ(x1,...,xn)
where B1,...,Bk are principals, R1,...,Rk are role terms, k is an integer greater than or equal to 1, pre-cond-1
and pre-cond-2 are two pre-conditions (which we discuss shortly), ψ is a constraint from a constraint domain Φ,
and x1,x2,...,xn are the variables in the ﬁelds of R1,...,Rk. The constraint ψ(x1,...,xn) is optional. We call
B1.R1 ∩     ∩ Bk.Rk in the policy statement an intersection.
A pre-condition (16) is deﬁned to be a role or the keyword false. The motivation for the pre-condition is that,
oftentimes, policiesmaycontainsensitiveinformation. Thepolicyenforcerdoesnotwanttorevealthepolicystatement
to everyone. If a pre-condition is false, the pre-condition is never satisﬁed. If the pre-condition is a role, say B.R,
then the negotiation opponent has to be a member of B.R for the pre-condition to be satisﬁed. Returning to the
policy body, if pre-cond-1 is satisﬁed (or if pre-cond-1 is omitted), then the negotiation opponent is allowed to see
B1.R1 ∩     ∩ Bk.Rk, otherwise, she is not permitted to know the content of this policy body. Once pre-cond-1 is
satisﬁed, if pre-cond-2 is also satisﬁed, then the negotiation opponent is allowed to see the constraint ψ(x1,...,xn).
Verifying that a principal satisﬁes a policy body takes two steps. In the ﬁrst step, the policy enforcer veriﬁes that
the principal has all roles and has provided all uncertiﬁed attributes given by B1.R1,...,Bk.Rk. In the second step,
the policy enforcer veriﬁes that the variables in the parameters of R1,...,Rk satisfy the constraint ψ(x1,...,xn).
Such two-step policy veriﬁcation process is made feasible by using cryptographic credentials and the associated cryp-
tographic tools (see Section 3). The ﬁrst step corresponds to verifying that the principal has the desired credentials.
The second step corresponds to verifying that the principal’s attribute values in the credentials satisfy the constraint
ψ(x1,...,xn). If ψ(x1,...,xn) is disclosed, which happens only when the second pre-condition has been satisﬁed,
then the principal can use zero-knowledge proof protocols to prove that her attribute values satisfy the constraint;
otherwise, the principal can elect to run a private policy evaluation protocol with the policy enforcer, enabling each to
determine whether she satisﬁes the constraint.
Using the example in Section 4.1, BookSt’s policy (m2) in Figure 1 is a policy statement with no constraint. It
states that BookSt considers a driver license from BMV to provide adequate documentation of date of birth. The
8variable x is used in the statement to indicate that the ﬁeld value of BookSt.DoB is the same as the DoB ﬁeld value
in BMV.driverLicense.
The BookSt policy statement (m1) means that, in order to be a member of the role BookSt.discount, a principal
has to have the roles BookSt.student(program = x1), BookSt.DoB(val = x2), and Any.phoneNum(val ⇒ x3). It
further requires that the program ﬁeld value x1 in BookSt.student and the DoB ﬁeld value x2 in BookSt.DoB satisfy
the constraint (x1 = ‘cs’) ∧ (x2 > ’01/01/1984’). The symbol ⇒ in the role Any.phoneNum(val ⇒ x3) indicates
that BookSt must receive a phone number from the negotiation opponent. Where the equality symbol = is used, the
policy requires only proof that the associated ﬁeld value satisﬁes any constraints given in the policy statement.
4.2.4 Policy heads
The policy head in a policy statement determines which resource is to be disclosed and how it is to be disclosed.
A policy head (21) can be a role or a disclosure. When the policy head is a role, the statement means that if the
negotiation opponent satisﬁes the policy body, then she is a member of the role. Roles deﬁned in policy statements
are controlled by the policy owner and are called dummy roles because they are not deﬁned in signed credentials, but
serve only to aid in deﬁning local policies. If the policy head is a disclosure, then the opponent is granted a permission
speciﬁed in the disclosure, once the policy body is satisﬁed. This section explains each type of disclosure and its
associated permission.
We call (the body of) a policy statement with head disclose(ack,A.R) (22) an Ack policy for the role A.R. The
opponent has to satisfy one of A.R’s Ack policies to gain permission to learn whether the policy enforcer is a member
of A.R. Until such satisfaction is shown, the policy enforcer’s behavior should not depend in any way on whether she
belongs to A.R.
We call a policy statement with head disclose(ac,A.R) (23) an AC policy for the credential A.R ←− D. We
assume, in this case, that the policy enforcer is D and that D has the membership credential A.R ←−D. When the
negotiation opponent has satisﬁed an AC policy for the credential A.R←−D, he is authorized to receive a copy of the
credential.
We call a policy statement with head disclose(full,attr) (24) a full policy for the attribute attr. If a full policy for
attr is satisﬁed, the negotiation opponent is allowed to see the full value of attr. When attr is an uncertiﬁed attribute,
the policy enforcer can simply disclose its value. When the ﬁeld value linked to the attribute reference of attr is a
commitment, the policy enforcer can open the commitment to the opponent.
We call a policy statement with head disclose(bit,attr) (25) a bit policy for the attribute attr. Bit policies are
deﬁned only for certiﬁed attributes. If a bit policy for attr is satisﬁed, the negotiation opponent has the permission
to receive one bit of information about the value of attr, in the sense of receiving the answer to the question whether
the value satisﬁes some predicate. We stress that the one bit information of attr in our context is not necessarily
the value of a certain bit in the binary representation of attr, but can be the output of any predicate on attr. More
speciﬁcally, the policy enforcer can run a private policy evaluation with the opponent in which the opponent learns
whether attr, together with other attributes of the enforcer, satisﬁes the opponent’s private policy. While specifying
the bit disclosure policy, one should be aware that the bit disclosure of attr is vulnerable to a probing attack. If an
adversarial opponent runs the private policy evaluation multiple times using different policies that constrain attr, she
may learn more information about the value of attr.
We call a policy statement with head disclose(range,attr, precision) (26) a range policy for the attribute attr.
Range policies are deﬁne only for certiﬁed attributes of certain data types, such as ﬁnite integer type, ﬁnite ﬂoat type,
and ordered enumeration type. If the range policy for attr is satisﬁed, then the negotiation opponent has permission
to learn that attr belongs to a range with the given precision. For example, if the negotiation opponent has satisﬁed
the policy for disclose(range,DoB,year), then she is allowed to know the year of DoB, but not the exact date. How
to specify a precision depends on the data type of the attribute. For example, assume credit score takes integer values
from 1 to 1000, and Alice has a credit score of 722 documented in her credit report certiﬁcate using cryptographic
credential schemes. If BookSt satisﬁes Alice’s policy of disclose(range,score,50), then Alice can prove to BookSt
that her credit score is between 701 and 750 using zero-knowledge proof protocols. Similarly, the policy with head
disclose(range,score,10) means that if the policy is satisﬁed, the opponent can learn that Alice’s credit score is
between 721 to 730.
95 The Extended Trust Target Graph (ETTG) Protocol
In this section, we introduce a trust negotiation protocol that can take advantage of ATNL and the cryptographic
protocols. This protocol extends the trust-target graph protocol introduced in [30, 31], to deal with the additional
features of ATNL and cryptographic certiﬁcates.
In this protocol, a trust negotiation process involves the two negotiators working together to construct a trust-target
graph (TTG). A TTG is a directed graph, each node of which is a trust target. Introduced below, trust targets represent
questions that negotiators have about each other. When a requester requests access to a resource, the access mediator
and the requester enter into a negotiation process. The access mediator creates a TTG containing one target, which we
call the primary target. The access mediator then tries to process the primary target by decomposing the question that
it asks and expanding the TTG accordingly in a manner described below. It then sends the partially processed TTG
to the requester. In each following round, one negotiator receives new information about changes to the TTG, veriﬁes
that the changes are legal and justiﬁed, and updates its local copy of the TTG accordingly. The negotiator then tries
to process some nodes, making its own changes to the graph, which it then sends to the other party, completing the
round. The negotiation succeeds when the primary target is satisﬁed; it fails when the primary target is failed, or when
a round occurs in which neither negotiator changes the graph.
5.1 Nodes in a Trust-Target Graph
A node in a TTG is one of the ﬁve kinds of targets, deﬁned as follows. we use the notation e և S for several different
categories of e, meaning that S belongs to, satisﬁes, or has the property e. We introduce the various usages of the
notation informally as they are used in the following list.
• A role target takes the form  V : A.R
?
և S , in which V is one of the negotiators, A.R is a role, and S is a
principal. S is often opp(V ), the negotiator opposing V , but it can be any principal. This target means that V
wants to see the proof of A.R և S.
• A policy target takes the form  V :policy-id
?
ևS , in which V is one of the negotiators, S is a principal, and
policy-id uniquely identiﬁes a policy statement in V ’s policy base. We assume each negotiator assigns each of
her policy statements a unique identiﬁer for this purpose. This target means that V wants to see the proof that S
satisﬁes the body of the statement corresponding to policy-id.
• An intersection target takes the form  V :B1.R1 ∩     ∩ Bk.Rk
?
ևS , in which V is one of the negotiators, S
is a principal, B1.R1,...,Bk.Rk are roles, k is an integer greater than 1. This means that V wants to see the
proof of B1.R1 ∩     ∩ Bk.Rk և S.
• A trivial target takes the form  V :S
?
ևS , in which V is one of the negotiators, and S is a principal. Trivial
targets provide placeholders for edges in the TTG.
• An attribute goal takes the form  V : attr
?
և S , in which attr is the name of an attribute in S’s attribute
declaration. This goal means that V wants to learn some information about the value of attr, e.g., V may want
to learn the full value of the attribute, or to learn partial information about the attribute, e.g., whether it satisﬁes
a policy.
In each of the above forms of targets, we call V the veriﬁer, and S the subject of this node. Each target has a
satisfaction state, which has one of three values: satisﬁed, failed, or unknown. The value is determined inductively
depending on the containing TTG structure and the credentials present, as discussed below.
5.2 Edges in a Trust-Target Graph
Seven kinds of edges are allowed in a trust-target graph, listed below. We use ֋ to represent edges in TTG’s.
10• A credential edge takes the form  V :A.R
?
ևS ֋ V :e
?
ևS , in which A.R is a role, and e is either a principle
or a role. We call  V :e
?
ևS  a credential child of  V :A.R
?
ևS . (We use similar “child” terminology for other
kinds of edges.) An edge always points from the child to the parent. Unlike the other kinds of edges, a credential
edge needs to be justiﬁed to be added into the TTG; a credential edge is justiﬁed if the edge is accompanied by
a credential that proves A.R և e.
• A policy edge takes the form  V :A.R
?
ևS ֋ V :policy-id
?
ևS , in which policy-id is a policy identiﬁer and
A.R is the role in the head of the policy statement (that corresponds to policy-id).
• A policy control edge takes the form  V : policy-id
?
և S  ֋  V : A.R
?
և S , in which policy-id is a policy
identiﬁer and A.R is one of the pre-conditions in the policy statement.
• A policy expansion edge takes the form  V : policy-id
?
և S  ֋  V : B1.R1 ∩     ∩ Bk.Rk
?
և S , in which
policy-id is a policy identiﬁer and B1.R1 ∩     ∩ Bk.Rk is the intersection in the policy statement. If k > 1,
the policy expansion child is an intersection target; otherwise, it is a role target. Each policy expansion edge has
associated with it up to one tag consisting of a constraint.
• An intersection edge takes the form  V :B1.R1 ∩     ∩ Bk.Rk
?
ևS ֋ V :Bi.Ri
?
ևS , where i is in 1..k, and
k is greater than 1.
• An attribute edge takes the form  V :A.R
?
ևS ֋ V :attr
?
ևS , in which S is the negotiation opponent of V ,
attr is an attribute name, and A.R is a role. This is used when the attribute attr is linked to a speciﬁc ﬁeld in
A.R in S’s attribute declarations.
• An attribute control edge takes the form  V : e
?
և S  ֋  opp(V ) : policy-id
?
և V  , in which opp(V ) denotes
the opponent of V , policy-id is a policy identiﬁer, and e is the role or attribute name in the head of the policy
statement. Attribute control edges are used for handling disclosure policies. Each attribute control edge has a
tag consisting of one of ac, ack, full, bit, or range; in the range case, it also includes a precision parameter.
The optional tag on a policy expansion edge is used to express the constraint portion of the policy statement
identiﬁed by policy-id. The tag on an attribute control edge characterizes the information that V can gain permission
to learn by satisfying the body of the statement identiﬁed by policy-id.
5.3 Overview of The Extended Trust-Target Graph (ETTG) Protocol
We now sketch the ETTG protocol. Details of the ETTG protocol are given in Appendix A. We begin with an example
of the ETTG protocol, then brieﬂy discuss how to process each node in TTG, and how to handle constraints in the
policies.
Example 1 This example is a simple instance of the ETTG protocol and illustrates the usage of the ﬁrst three prop-
erties described in Section 3. Referring to the bookstore example in Section 4.1, we depict the ﬁnal TTG in Figure 4.
Alice and BookSt run the ETTG protocol as follows: As BookSt wants to see the proof of BookSt.discount և Alice
in order to grant Alice access, BookSt creates the primary target (node 1) for the negotiation and sets its satisfaction
state to be unknown. If node 1 becomes satisﬁed, then the negotiation succeeds. In BookSt’s policy base, there is a
policy statement (m1) for BookSt.discount, hence BookSt creates a policy target (node 2) and adds a policy edge
between node 1 and node 2. As the policy statement (m1) has no pre-conditions, BookSt reveals the policy by adding
a policy expansion child (node 3) and a constraint tag between the parent (node 2) and the child (node 3). Based on
the policy (m1), BookSt wants to see Alice’s phone number and wants to know whether Alice’s program and DoB
satisfy his constraint. BookSt then creates node 4, 5, 6 and adds them as intersection children to node 3. Since the role
BookSt.DoB is a dummy role and there are policies (m2,m3) associated with it, BookSt adds a policy target (node
7) as the policy child to node 6. BookSt then adds a policy expansion child (node 8) to node 7. Similarly, BookSt adds
node 9 and 10. Essentially, BookSt wants to see Alice’s DoB from either a driver license or a passport. Now BookSt
cannot process the TTG any more.
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Figure 4: Final TTG for the bookstore example. In this ﬁgure, ← denotes the symbol և, A denotes Alice, and B
denotes BookSt. The white nodes are created by BookSt and the grey nodes are created by Alice.
After receiving the TTG from BookSt, Alice begins to process the graph. Alice ﬁrst discloses her credential n1 (as
it is not sensitive) and adds a credential child (node 11). She cannot disclosure her student credential (n2) immediately,
as there exists an AC policy (p1) for n2. Therefore Alice adds a policy target (node 12) and expands it with a role
target (node 13). Note that the edge between node 11 and 12 is an attribute control edge, which means that if node 12
is satisﬁed, then Alice can disclose her student credential (n2). Alice also reveals her digital driver license (without
revealing her DoB) to BookSt, creates a trivial target (node 14), and adds a credential edge between node 8 and node
14. At this point, Alice notices that she needs to prove she is younger than ‘1/1/1984’ and to reveal her phone number,
she adds an attribute goal (node 15) for her DoB attribute and another attribute goal (node 19) for her phoneNum, she
also expands the TTG by adding nodes 16, 17, 18, 20. As the node 16 is trivially satisﬁed (because the policy for p4
is true), Alice proves to BookSt that she is born in 1986. Alice’s year of birth ﬂows up from node 8 to node 3.
BookSt shows to Alice his StateU.businessLicense certiﬁcate and BBB.goodSecProcess certiﬁcate, which trig-
gers the satisfaction of the nodes 12 and 20. Alice then reveals her student credential (n2) and her uncertiﬁed
phoneNum. The values of Alice’s attribute program and phoneNum ﬂow up to node 3, where BookSt veriﬁes
that Alice’s attributes satisfy the constraint. Finally, the primary target is satisﬁed and the negotiation succeeds.
Node Processing in ETTG We brieﬂy explain how each node is processed in the ETTG protocol.
1. Role target. Suppose the role in a role target T =  V : V.R
?
և S  is a dummy role. For each of the veriﬁer’s
policies that have V.R as the policy head, the veriﬁer adds a new policy child for T. The role target is satisﬁed
if one of its children is satisﬁed.
Now suppose the role in a role target T =  V : A.R
?
և S  is not a dummy role. If the opponent of V has an
Ack policy for A.R, he adds an attribute control child for T. Once the Ack policy (if any) has been satisﬁed, if
12the opponent has an AC policy for A.R, he adds another attribute control child. After all of T’s attribute control
children have been satisﬁed, the opponent can disclose his credential for A.R (if any), adds a credential edge,
and marks T satisﬁed. If the credential disclosed is a membership credential, then for each ﬁeld in A.R, if there
is a sensitive attribute linked to the ﬁeld in the opponent’s attribute declarations, the opponent adds an attribute
child for that attribute.
2. Policy target. Consider the policy target T =  V : policy-id
?
և S . Suppose the policy body associated with
policy-id takes the form pre-cond-1! B1.R1 ∩     ∩ Bk.Rk ; pre-cond-2! ψ(x1,...,xn). The veriﬁer ﬁrst
adds a policy control child for pre-cond-1. Once the policy control child is satisﬁed, the veriﬁer adds a policy
expansion child for B1.R1 ∩     ∩ Bk.Rk and a policy control child for pre-cond-2. If the policy control child
for pre-cond-2 is satisﬁed, the veriﬁer adds the constraint ψ(x1,...,xn) as a tag on the policy expansion edge.
A policy target is satisﬁed if its policy expansion child is satisﬁed and the constraint is evaluated and satisﬁed.
We explain how and when to evaluate a constraint below.
3. Intersection target. For the intersection target T =  V : B1.R1 ∩     ∩ Bk.Rk
?
և S , the veriﬁer adds an
intersection child for each role Bi.Ri. The intersection target is satisﬁed if all of its intersection children are
satisﬁed.
4. Attribute goal. For the attribute target T =  V :attr
?
ևS , the opponent adds an attribute policy child for each
disclosure policy that contains attr in the policy head.
Constraint Handling We now explain how the constraint of a policy is evaluated. If there is a constraint tag in the
policy expansion edge of the policy (i.e., the constraint is revealed to the opponent), it can be evaluated as follows:
Whenever a full disclosure policy or a range disclosure policy for an attribute is satisﬁed by the veriﬁer, the opponent
reveals the attribute information accordingly. The attribute information ﬂows from the attribute goal to the policy
expansion edge where the constraint is attached. At the policy expansion edge, when the veriﬁer receives enough
information from the opponent to determine whether or not the constraint is satisﬁed, he evaluates the constraint based
on the attribute information received so far and outputs the result.
If there is no constraint tag in the policy expansion edge (i.e., the pre-condition for the constraint has not been
satisﬁed), the veriﬁer can satisfy all the full disclosure policies of the attributes required in the constraint, enabling it
to obtain all the attribute values from the opponent. The veriﬁer then evaluates the constraint secretly and informs the
opponent the result of the evaluation. Alternatively, the veriﬁer can try to satisfy all the bit disclosure policies of the
attributes, and then run a private policy evaluation protocol with the opponent.
5.4 Additional Examples
In this section, we give two additional examples that illustrate the ATNL language and the ETTG protocol. Example 2
deals with the scenario in which the constraint is private; example 3 illustrates how the ETTG protocol breaks the
policy cycles.
Example 2 This example illustrates the usage of properties 1, 2, and 6 (private policy evaluation) described in Sec-
tion 3. Suppose BankWon, an online bank certiﬁed by National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), offers a special-
rate loan. Before applying the loan, an applicant is required to show a valid driver license. The loan policy is that
the applicant must have either (1) a credit score more than 680 and an income more than 55k, or (2) a credit score
more than 700 and an income more than 45k. BankWon considers his loan policy as private information, and discloses
(the thresholds of) the policy only to BankWon’s preferred members. Carol, who is not one of BankWon’s preferred
members, wants to know whether she is eligible for that loan. She has a credit report from Experian and a tax certiﬁ-
cate from Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Carol considers her credit score and her income to be sensitive attributes.
BankWon and Carol’s credentials and policies are given in Figure 5.
Using the ETTG protocol, BankWon and Carol can negotiate trust successfully. The ﬁnal TTG of the negotiation
is given in Figure 6. In the ETTG protocol, BankWon ﬁrst creates a primary target (node 1), a policy target (node 2),
and a role target (node 3). The edge between node 2 and 3 is a policy control edge. After Carol reveals her driver
license and adds node 4, BankWon is able to expand the loan policy and adds nodes 5 – 14. Carol then reveals her tax
13Bank’s credentials and policies:
q1 : NCUA.member ←− Bank
r1 : Bank.loan ←− BMV.driverLicense ! IRS.tax(income = x1) ∩ Bank.credScore(val = x2) ;
Bank.preferred ! ((x1 > 680) ∧ (x2 > ‘55k’)) ∨ ((x1 > 700) ∧ (x2 > ‘45k’)
r2 : Bank.credScore(val = x) ←− Equifax.credReport(score = x)
r3 : Bank.credScore(val = x) ←− Experian.credReport(score = x)
r4 : Bank.credScore(val = x) ←− TransUnion.credReport(score = x)
Carol’s credentials:
s1 : Experian.credReport(score = commit(720)) ←− Carol
s2 : IRS.tax(income = commit(‘65k’),employer = commit(‘Company A’)) ←− Carol
s3 : BMV.driverLicense(name = ‘Carol’,DoB = commit(‘06/18/1972’)) ←− Carol
Carol’s attribute declarations:
t1 : DoB = ‘06/18/1972’ :: BMV.driverLicense(DoB) :: sensitive
t2 : score = 720 :: Experian.credReport(score) :: sensitive
t3 : income = ‘48k’ :: IRS.tax(income) :: sensitive
t4 : employer = ‘Company A’ :: IRS.tax(employer) :: non-sensitive
Carol’s policies:
u1 : disclose(full,DoB) ←− BBB.goodSecProcess
u2 : disclose(bit,score) ←− NCUA.member
u3 : disclose(range,score,50) ←− true
u4 : disclose(bit,income) ←− true
u5 : disclose(range,income,10k) ←− BBB.goodSecProcess
Figure 5: The credentials and policies for Example 2
certiﬁcate and credit report without revealing her sensitive attributes to BankWon, and adds two attribute goals (node
15 and 19) to TTG. As node 6 is not satisﬁed, the constraint of the loan policy is not revealed to Carol. However, as the
bit policies for Alice’s income and score are satisﬁed, Carol and BankWon are able to run a private policy evaluation
on income and score with BankWon’s private constraint. After the private policy evaluation outputs true (i.e., Carol’s
certiﬁed attributes satisfy the constraint), node 2 becomes satisﬁed. In the end, node 1 is also satisﬁed and the ETTG
protocol succeeds.
Example 3 This example illustratesthe usage of properties 1, 2, 4, and 5 (oblivious usage of credentials and attributes)
described in Section 3. Suppose Bob, a CIA agent, has a secret document to which the access is allowed by CIA agents
only. Bob has a security clearance certiﬁcate from Gov with the security level committed in it. Bob can show his CIA
agent credential only to his peers, and can reveal his security clearance level only to those whose security level is
greater than or equal to 3. Similarly, Alice has a CIA agent credential and a security clearance certiﬁcate with certain
disclosure policies. Alice shows her CIA agent credential only to CIA agents with security level greater than or equal
to 2. And she discloses her security level only to CIA agents. See Figure 7 for the description of the credentials and
policies in ATNL. When Alice wants to access Bob’s document, they engage the ETTG protocol and build a TTG as
depicted in Figure 8(a).
There are two policy cycles in the TTG, one cycle has nodes 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8, the other cycle has nodes 3, 4, 5,
7, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 6, and 8. Without breaking the policy cycles, the negotiation between Alice and Bob would
fail, because neither Alice nor Bob can update the TTG any more. As the two policy cycles share common nodes,
we cannot break them separately. See Figure 8(b) for the dependency relation between Alice and Bob’s attributes. To
break the policy cycles, Alice and Bob run an OSBE protocol [21] in which Bob delivers an envelope to Alice with the
property that Alice can open the envelope if she has a CIA agent credential. This envelope contains Bob’s CIA agent
credential. In the mean time, they run an OCBE protocol [19] in which Bob delivers another envelope to Alice such
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Figure 6: Final TTG for Example 2. In this ﬁgure, ← denotes the symbol և, B denotes Bank, and C denotes Carol.
The white nodes are created by Bank and the grey nodes are created by Carol.
Bob’s credentials, attributes, and policies:
v1 : CIA.agent ←− Bob
v2 : Gov.secClearance(level = commit(3)) ←− Bob
v3 : level = 3 :: Gov.secClearance(level) :: sensitive
w1 : Bob.document ←− CIA.agent
w2 : disclose(ack,CIA.agent) ←− CIA.agent
w3 : disclose(full,level) ←− Gov.secClearance(level = x) ; x ≥ 3
Alice’s credentials, attributes, and policies:
x1 : CIA.agent ←− Alice
x2 : Gov.secClearance(level = commit(4)) ←− Alice
x3 : level = 4 :: Gov.secClearance(level) :: sensitive
y1 : disclose(ack,CIA.agent) ←− CIA.agent ∩ Gov.secClearance(level = x) ; x ≥ 2
y2 : disclose(full,level) ←− CIA.agent
Figure 7: The credentials and policies for Example 3
that Alice can open the envelope if and only if her security level is greater than 2. In the second envelope, Bob opens
the commitment of his security level. Bob learns nothing from the previous interactions. After Alice opened the two
envelopes, she veriﬁes whether the received CIA credential and security level satisfy her policies. If so, she reveals
her CIA agent credential and her security level to Bob. Now the policy cycles are broken.
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Figure 8: (a) Final TTG for the Example 3. In this ﬁgure, ← denotes the symbol և, A denotes Alice, and B denotes
Bob. The white nodes are created by Bob and the grey nodes are created by Alice. (b) Disclosure dependency graph
for Alice’s and Bob’s sensitive attributes.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We have introduced a framework for ATN that supports the combined use of several cryptographic credential schemes
and protocols that have been previously introduced piecemeal to provide capabilities that are useful in various nego-
tiation scenarios. Our framework enables these various schemes to be combined ﬂexibly and synergistically, on the
ﬂy as the need arises. The framework has two key components: ATNL, a policy language that enables negotiators to
specify authorization requirements that must be met by an opponent to receive various amounts of information about
certiﬁed attributes and the credentials that contain it; ETTG, an ATN protocol that organizes negotiation objectives
and the use of cryptographic techniques to meet those objectives. We have shown several examples that illustrate how
our framework enables negotiations to succeed that would not were they conducted using traditional ATN techniques.
The appendix presents the details of the process of constructing the trust target graph and other aspects of the ETTG
negotiation state. In on-going research we are developing comprehensive analysis algorithms that negotiators will use
to recognize all cyclic dependencies that can be resolved.
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A Details of the ETTG protocol
In this Appendix, we present the details of the ETTG protocol. We ﬁrst describe how states are propagated in TTG,
then describe the messages in the protocol, ﬁnally present how nodes are processed.
A.1 State Propagation in TTG
Each node has a processing state, which is a pair of boolean states: veriﬁer-processed and opponent-processed. A
node is veriﬁer-processed when the veriﬁer cannot process the node any further, i.e., the veriﬁer cannot add any new
child to the node. A node is opponent-processed when the opponent cannot process the node any further. When a node
is both veriﬁer-processed and opponent-processed, we say that it is fully processed.
Each target has a satisfaction state, which has one of three values: satisﬁed, failed, and unknown. For each ﬁeld
in the roles of a role node or an intersection node, there is a ﬁeld state. Each ﬁeld state has multiple entries depending
on how many disclosure policies this attribute has. For example, if an attribute has a full disclosure policy and a bit
disclosure policy, then the ﬁeld state has two entries, one for the full policy, the other for the bit policy. The entry in
the ﬁeld state for the bit policy takes either true or false value. The entry for other policies can take arbitrary values.
Each attribute has an attribute state. An attribute state has multiple entries depending on how many disclosure policies
this attribute has. Each entry can be one of the two values: true or false. A true value means the corresponding policy
in that entry has been satisﬁed. A false value means the corresponding policy has not been satisﬁed.
We now describe how to determine the satisfaction state of targets, the ﬁeld state of ﬁelds, and the attribute state
of attribute goals.
Satisfaction state The trust target satisfaction state is determined as follows:
1. Role target. The initial satisfaction state a role target is unknown. It becomes fully satisﬁed when one of its
credential children or one of its policy children is fully satisﬁed, and for each ﬁeld in its role with the ⇒ symbol
(the veriﬁer wants to see the full value of this ﬁeld), the full policy entry in its ﬁeld state table is not empty (the
full value of the ﬁeld has been disclosed). It becomes failed when it is full processed and it has no child, or
all of its children are failed, or there exists some ﬁeld in the role with the ⇒ symbol whose value has not been
disclosed.
2. Policy target. Let policy-id be the policy identiﬁer in this policy target. If the policy body corresponding to
policy-id is true, then the satisfaction state of this target is fully satisﬁed. Otherwise, the initial satisfaction state
of a policy target is unknown.
(a) If there is no constraint in the policy corresponding to policy-id, the satisfaction state of the policy target
becomes satisﬁed when it is full processed and its policy expansion child is satisﬁed. It becomes failed
when either it has no policy expansion child (the pre-condition for the policy has not been satisﬁed) or its
policy expansion child is failed.
19(b) If there is a constraint in the policy corresponding to policy-id, the satisfaction state of the policy target
becomes satisﬁed when it is full processed, its policy expansion child is satisﬁed, and the constraint is
evaluated and also satisﬁed. If the constraint has been revealed (i.e., there exists a policy control child for
the constraint), it can be evaluated when the value or the range of each variable in the constraint has been
disclosed. If the constraint is private, it can be evaluated using the private policy evaluation, or the full
value of each variable in the policy has been disclosed. It becomes failed when it has no policy expansion
child, or its policy expansion child is failed, or the constraint cannot be evaluated, or the constraint is not
satisﬁed.
3. Intersection target. The initial satisfaction state of an intersection target is unknown. It becomes satisﬁed when
it is fully processed and all of its children are satisﬁed. It becomes failed when one of its children is failed.
4. Trivial target. A trivial target is always fully satisﬁed.
Field state Informally speaking, the values of ﬁeld state ﬂow up from child to parent. There is no entry when a ﬁeld
state is initialized. The values of the ﬁeld state are copied from one of its children or its grandchildren, if the values
are available. If the current node has a non-delegation credential child and the corresponding credential is a regular
credential (such as X.509 certiﬁcate), then write the full value of the ﬁeld to the full entry. Otherwise, if the current
node has an attribute child, depends on the attribute state of the attribute goal, the opponent reveals the attribute value
according. For example, if the full entry in the attribute child is true, then the opponent reveals the full value of the
ﬁeld and write the value in the full entry of the ﬁeld state. If the bit entry in the attribute state of the attribute child is
true, the bit entry in the ﬁeld state is set to be true also. If a range disclosure entry in the attribute state of the attribute
child is true, the opponent proves that the ﬁeld value belongs to some range according the precision parameter.
Attribute state Let attr be the attribute name in the attribute goal. If there is a disclosure policy for attr, we add an
entry in the attribute state. The initial value for that entry is false. If the satisfaction state of the attribute control child
corresponding to the disclosure policy becomes satisﬁed, the value of the entry becomes true.
The legal update operations do not remove nodes or edges once they have been added, and once a node is fully
processed, it remains so thereafter. Consequently, once a target becomes satisﬁed or failed, it retains that state for the
duration of the negotiation.
A.2 Messages in the Protocol
As described before, negotiators cooperate through use of the protocol in constructing a shared TTG, a copy of which
is maintained by each negotiator. Negotiators alternate transmitting messages that each contains a sequence of TTG
update operations and a set of credentials to be used in justifying credential edges. Negotiators may also run a set
of cryptographic protocols described in Section 3 during the ETTG protocol. On receiving a update operation, a
negotiator veriﬁes it is legal before updating its local copy of the shared TTG. The following are legal TTG update
operations:
• Initialize the TTG to contain a given primary trust target (TT), specifying a legal initial processing state for this
node. (See below.)
• Add a justiﬁed edge (not already in the graph) from a TT that is not yet in the graph to one that is, specifying a
legal initial processing state for the new node. The new TT is added to the graph as well as the edge.
• Add a justiﬁed edge (not already in the graph) from an old node to an old node.
• Mark a node processed. If the sender is the veriﬁer, this marks the node veriﬁer-processed; otherwise, it marks
it opponent-processed.
The legal initial processing state of a trivial target is fully-processed. Both a policy target and an intersection
target are initially opponent-processed. An attribute goal is initially veriﬁer-processed. A role target is initially either
opponent-processed or veriﬁed processed. These operations construct a connected graph. Satisfaction state of trust
targets, ﬁeld state of ﬁelds in trust targets, and attribute state of attribute goals are not transmitted in messages; instead,
each negotiation party infers them independently.
20A.3 Node Processing
Previously we described the TTG negotiation protocol, in which two negotiators exchange update messages. The
protocol deﬁnes what updates are legal, and the receiver of a message can verify that the updates in the message is
legal. We now describe procedures for correct processing, which update the TTG in a manner designed to satisfy the
primary target whenever this is possible, while enforcing each negotiator’s policies. Correct processing continues until
either the primary target is satisﬁed (negotiation success), it is failed (negotiation failure), or neither negotiator can
perform a correct update (also negotiation failure).
Note that a negotiator cannot be forced to follow the correct procedures, and when it does not, the other negotiator
may not be able to tell. The protocol and the correct processing procedures are intended to guarantee that a misbehav-
ing negotiator can never gain advantage (either learn information or gain access without satisfying relevant policies
ﬁrst) over a faithful negotiator who follows the protocol and the correct procedures. Therefore, a normal negotiator
has no incentive to misbehave. Still, it is always within the power of either negotiator to behave incorrectly, and doing
so may prevent the negotiation from succeeding. For instance, either negotiator can simply abort the negotiation at
any time.
A.3.1 Node Processing State Initialization
When a new node is added to a TTG, its processing state should be initialized as follows:
• A trivial target is fully processed.
• For a role target,  KV :K.r
?
ևKS , if K.r is a dummy role, the target is opponent-processed, which means that
the opponent cannot process it; otherwise, it is veriﬁer-processed.
• A policy target is initially opponent-processed.
• An intersection target is initially opponent-processed.
• An attribute goal is initially veriﬁer-processed.
A.3.2 Veriﬁer-Side Processing
We now describe how a negotiator V process a node when it is the veriﬁer of the node. These rules apply to nodes that
are not yet marked veriﬁer-processed.
1. Processing T =  V :A.R
?
ևS 
(a) For each of V ’s local policy statements in which A.R is a dummy role in the policy head and policy-id is the
corresponding policy identiﬁer, V can add a policy edge T ֋ V :policy-id
?
ևS .
(b) V can mark T as veriﬁer-processed only after (a) is done, meaning that all edges that can be added according to
(a) have been added.
2. Processing T =  V :policy-id
?
ևS 
(a) Let [pre-cond-1 !] B1.R1 ∩     ∩ Bk.Rk ; [[pre-cond-2 !] ψ(x1,...,xn)] be the policy body corresponding to
policy-id. If pre-cond-1 is a role, say A1.R1, V can add a policy control edge T ֋ V :A1.R1
?
ևS .
(b) After (a) is done and  V : A1.R1
?
և S  is satisﬁed, or there is no pre-condition for the intersection, V can add a
policy expansion edge T ֋ V :B1.R1 ∩     ∩ Bk.Rk
?
ևS .
(c) Suppose there is a constraint for this policy. If pre-cond-2 is a role, say A2.R2, V can add a policy control edge
T ֋ V :A2.R2
?
ևS .
(d) After (c) is done and  V :A2.R2
?
ևS  is satisﬁed, or there is no pre-condition for the constraint, V can add a tag
to the policy expansion edge with the constraint in it.
(e) V can mark T as veriﬁer-processed only after (d) is done or (b) is done if there is no constraint for the policy.
213. Processing T =  V :B1.R1 ∩     ∩ Bk.Rk
?
ևS 
(a) V can add the k intersection edges, T ֋ V :Bi.Ri
?
ևKS , 1 ≤ i ≤ k
(b) V can mark T veriﬁer-processed only after (a) is done.
A.3.3 Opponent-Side Processing
We now describe how a negotiator S process a node when it is the opponent of the veriﬁer of the node. These rules
apply to nodes that are not yet marked opponent-processed.
1. Processing T =  V :A.R
?
ևS 
(a) If there exists a policy statement with head disclose(ack,A.R), S can add an attribute control edge T ֋  S :
ack-id
?
ևV  , where ack-id is the policy identiﬁer for the ack policy.
(b) After (a) is done and  S:ack-id
?
ևV   is satisﬁed (if it exists), if S has the credential A.R←−S, and if there exist
a policy statement ac-id with head disclose(ac,A.R), S can add an attribute control edge T ֋ S:ac-id
?
ևV  .
(c) After (b) is done and  S:ac-id
?
ևV   (if it exists) is satisﬁed, S can add the credential edge T ֋ V :S
?
ևS .
(d) After (a) is done and  S :ack-id
?
ևV   is satisﬁed, if S has a delegation credential A.R←−A1.R1, S can add the
credential edge T ֋ V :A1.R1
?
ևS .
(e) S can mark T as opponent-processed if T is satisﬁed, or all of the above steps are done.
2. Processing T =  V :attr
?
ևS 
(a) If there exists a policy statement full-id with head disclose(full,attr), S can add an attribute control edge T ֋
 S:full-id
?
ևV  .
(b) If there exists a policy statement bit-id with head disclose(bit,attr), S can add an attribute control edge T ֋ S:
bit-id
?
ևV  .
(c) If there exists a policy statement range-id with head disclose(range,attr,precision), S can add an attribute
control edge T ֋ S:range-id
?
ևV  .
(d) S can mark T as opponent-processed if T is satisﬁed, or all of the above steps are done.
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